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Abstract We offer an analysis of the existence of a positive relationship between minimum 
wages and economic growth in a simple one-sector overlapping generations economy where the 
usual Romer-typed knowledge spill-over mechanism in production represents the engine of 
endogenous growth, in the case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous (i.e., skilled and unskilled) 
labour. Assuming also the existence of unemployment benefits financed with consumption taxes not 
conditioned on age at a balanced budget, it is shown that minimum wages may stimulate economic 
growth and welfare despite the unemployment occurrence. Moreover, a growth-maximising 
minimum wage can exist. A straightforward message, therefore, is that a combination of minimum 
wage and unemployment benefit policies can appropriately be used to promote balanced growth and 
welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An important and largely debated argument in the economic literature deals with the effects of 
minimum wages in aggregate macroeconomic models in both static and dynamic contexts. 
Opponents viewed the minimum wage as a bad social policy, essentially because it deteriorates 
employment and output.1 Proponents, instead, typically focused on redistributive goals the 
minimum wage may create. Moreover, minimum wage legislation can also have important 
interactions with the social welfare system (e.g., the unemployment benefit system, see Shimer and 
Werning, 2007), especially in Europe where labour market rigidities represent relevant aspects of 
real phenomena (see, e.g., Blanchard, 1998). 
    Even if minimum wages and unemployment compensations cannot probably be expected to 
greatly reduce household’s poverty (see, e.g., OECD, 1998; Müller and Steiner, 2008), their 
effectiveness in reducing income inequality among households is recognised to be greater, that is 
minimum wage legislation has been prevalently used for equity reasons thus trading-off with 
efficiency goals (see, e.g., Tamai, 2009 for a theoretical analysis of the effects of the minimum 
wage on income inequality.2 As regards empirical evidence, two important papers that analyse how 
                                               
1
 The debate about the effects of the minimum wage on employment has seen renewed interest starting from the works 
by Neumark and Wascher (1995), where it is found evidence of the existence of significant enrolment and employment 
shifts due to minimum wage increases for young workers, and by Card and Krueger (1994, 1995, 1998), where positive 
jobs gains rather than losses can, in some circumstances, be obtained. For an analysis of the effects of introducing or 
removing the minimum wage on employment and the reservation wage, see also the recent paper by Falk et al. (2006). 
Finally, an interesting review of the empirical literature on the employment effects of the minimum wage is Neumark 
and Wascher (2006). 
2
 In particular, Tamai (2009) used a continuous-time endogenous growth model à la Romer with heterogeneous 
households (divided by ability) and political determination of the minimum wage to analyse how inequality, 
unemployment and growth are related. He found that a positive correlation between inequality and unemployment can 
On economic growth and minimum wages 
 3 
institutional changes in the labour market can affect wage inequality in the United States, are 
DiNardo et al., 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 19973). 
    Our knowledge of the effects of minimum wages in aggregate macroeconomic models has been 
firstly improved by the seminal paper by Stigler (1946). The basic (one-sector, static, partial 
equilibrium) model of the minimum wage effects on employment and unemployment focuses on a 
single competitive labour market with homogeneous workers (all covered by the legislated wage), 
and predicts that minimum wages cause both employment and output reductions. 
    In dynamic contexts, however, the impact of legislated wage minima on employment, economic 
growth and welfare is controversial. In particular, it has been shown that if the minimum wage 
generates some positive externalities it can be growth improving under certain conditions. 
    Generally speaking, economic growth models with minimum wages, thus linking growth and 
unemployment, could be divided at least in three categories: (i) overlapping generations two sector 
closed-economy models where the minimum wage in the market for raw labour generates some 
positive external effects on the accumulation of human capital (Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Ravn and 
Sørensen, 1999); (ii) minimum wage effects in an open economy either with two-period 
overlapping generations (Irmen and Wigger, 2006) or in infinite horizon continuous-time growth 
models (Askenazy, 2003); (iii) Schumpeterian growth models with labour market imperfections 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Meckl, 2004). All these papers, however, strongly deviate from the 
                                                                                                                                                            
exist. A rise in inequality (which in turn implies a higher minimum wage), therefore, promotes growth if the former is 
high enough. 
3
 The former authors found that the fall in the minimum wage and the de-unionisation process in the U.S. contributed to 
explain the rise in wage inequality so that institutions “are as important as supply and demand considerations [see Katz 
and Murphy, 1992] in explaining changes in the U.S. distribution of wages from 1979 to 1988.” (DiNardo et al., 1996, 
p. 1001). The latter authors analysed the effects institutional changes in the U.S. in the 1980s founding that de-
unionisation can explain the rise in wage inequality for men and the minimum wage is important for women. They 
concluded, however, that “When men and women are considered together, institutions have an even larger impact on 
inequality.” (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997, p. 75–76). 
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basic one-sector closed-economy growth model à la Romer with overlapping generations and Cobb-
Douglas utility and production functions, which is precisely the framework used here to assess the 
role the minimum wage can play on economic growth and welfare when unemployment benefits 
financed with consumption taxes at a balanced budget also exist, and most important, no external 
effects induced by the minimum wage are involved. In a closed economy with no external effects of 
the minimum wage, conclusions are essentially for a negative role of the minimum wage on growth 
and welfare as well as a rise in unemployment. 
    We now briefly review some of the main contributions relating minimum wages, unemployment 
and growth. As regards models of point (i) above (growth-promoting externalities of the minimum 
wage), Cahuc and Michel (1996), in particular, studied how the minimum wage for unskilled labour 
affects economic growth and welfare in a two-sector OLG closed economy model with endogenous 
growth à la Lucas (1988). They assumed that the introduction of a binding minimum wage in the 
market for unskilled labour causes a positive external effect on the accumulation of human capital 
because the demand for skilled labour raises and, hence, unskilled workers wish to improve their 
level of skills in order to avoid unemployment. Because of such an externality, the minimum wage 
may promote growth and welfare. However, Cahuc and Michel also remarked that in an exogenous 
(neoclassical) growth context, minimum wages actually increase unemployment and reduce growth 
(see Cahuc and Michel, 1996, Proposition 1, p. 1469), in line with the traditional negative view of 
labour market rigidities. Another important paper where the minimum wage is assumed to create 
growth-promoting externalities in a closed economy is Ravn and Sørensen (1999). Using the same 
OLG endogenous growth context as in Cahuc and Michel, they assumed that a minimum wage for 
the unskilled affects labour productivity growth through two sources of accumulation of skills: 
schooling before entering the labour market and training on the job, showing that the final effect of 
a rise in the minimum wage on growth is potentially uncertain because it can induce skill formation 
through schooling and reduce training. 
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    As regards models of point (ii), (minimum wage in open economies) an important contribution is 
Askenazy (2003), who analysed the effects of the minimum wage on growth in an open economy 
model but assuming, different from Cahuc and Michel and Ravn and Sørensen, a continuous time 
endogenous growth model à la Ramsey where the minimum wage causes a shift of efforts from the 
production sector to the R&D sector and thus may stimulate growth through this channel. Another 
interesting paper in an open economy context is Irmen and Wigger (2006), where, different from all 
the three previous mentioned papers, no growth-promoting externalities induced by minimum 
wages are assumed. In particular, they considered an OLG two-country endogenous growth model à 
la Romer with capital mobility, and showed that a binding minimum wage in the domestic country 
may stimulate global economic growth, depending on the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and efficient labour, the output elasticity of efficient labour and the differences between the 
propensity to save in both the foreign and domestic countries. This in turn implies that with Cobb-
Douglas production function and/or uniform propensity to save, minimum wages would be harmful 
to the global economic growth, thus confirming that in the absence of an externality channel the 
conventional belief about the growth depressing role of minimum wages holds. 
    Moreover, for the sake of completeness, it is important to note that another strand of literature 
exists where unemployment and growth can be positively related owing to the well-known 
Schumpeterian idea of creative-disruption (i.e., models of point (iii) above that were pioneered by 
Aghion and Howitt, 1994, where the intrasectoral allocation of labour within the sector that 
produces intermediate goods determines the unemployment rate). In this context, an interesting 
recent paper that treats minimum wages within an innovation-based growth model with three 
sectors of production is Meckl (2004). Growth and unemployment are ambiguously related and this 
depends on the sign of the wage differentials between sectors (the final-good sector; the 
intermediate-good sector; the R&D sector), i.e. the intersectoral allocation of labour matters. The 
higher the wage in the R&D sector, the more likely growth and unemployment will be positively 
correlated. 
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    As we briefly mentioned above, all these papers abstract from studying the effects of legally set 
wage minima and unemployment benefits in a simple one-sector closed-economy model with 
endogenous growth. The object of the present paper, therefore, is to fill this gap using a minimal set 
of assumptions within a double Cobb-Douglas OLG economy, where the usual technological 
externality à la Romer (1986) represents the engine of endogenous growth, and, different from the 
previous theoretical literature framed in the OLG context, without assuming the existence of any 
growth sustaining externalities the minimum wage can generate. In particular, we study the 
interaction between minimum wages and growth, showing a new theoretical channel with which 
minimum wage policies can effectively be used as a stimulus to economic growth and welfare, 
despite the resulting unemployment they create. In fact, even if the introduction of a wage floor 
causes unemployment, if the replacement rate (as part of the unemployment benefit system) is 
larger than the weight of the labour input in production the positive growth effect due to the 
increased workers’ income dominates the negative unemployment effect, and this eventually spurs 
economic growth beyond the laissez-faire level. 
    In particular, in this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a regulated-wage 
economy with unemployment to grow faster than the competitive-wage economy with full 
employment. Interestingly, there exist (i) a whole range of minimum wages that can be used by the 
government to promote growth, and (ii) a growth-maximising minimum wage. We also show that in 
the long run, individuals may be better off in an economy with regulated-wages and the highest 
possible welfare level is achieved when growth is maximised. Moreover, an important result should 
be remarked: the growth and welfare promoting effects of the minimum wage hold in the case of 
both homogeneous and heterogeneous (i.e., skilled and unskilled) labour. While in the former case, 
the minimum wage is defined as a mark up over the equilibrium competitive wage and cover all 
workers, in the latter case it is fixed as a mark up over competitive wage in market for raw labour 
only. However, since in real economies the minimum wage is computed as a fraction of average 
earnings, and beneficiaries are essentially the poorest amongst low-paid workers, in the model with 
On economic growth and minimum wages 
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labour heterogeneity we also present numerical simulations to test for the robustness of our 
theoretical results by considering the more realistic case of a minimum wage floor fixed as a 
percentage of the average wage. As to this purpose, we calibrate our stylised economy to study the 
case of France, where debates about whether increasing or reducing the minimum wage were 
intense. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop the baseline model 
with homogeneous labour and consumption taxation not conditioned on age. In Section 3 we 
analyse the effects of the minimum wage on economic growth. Section 4 looks at welfare effects 
the minimum wage generates. Section 5 presents some extensions and introduces, in particular, the 
hypothesis of skilled and unskilled labour with a minimum wage being fixed only for the latter 
category. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. Individuals 
 
Consider a general equilibrium closed economy with overlapping generations. Each generation is 
composed by a continuum of N  identical two-period lived individuals (Diamond, 1965). When 
young, each individual is endowed with one unit of time inelastically supplied on the labour market. 
When old, she is retired. 
    The lifetime (logarithmic) utility function of agent j  born at t  ( tjU ) is defined over young-aged 
and old-aged consumptions, tjc ,1  and 1,2 +tjc , respectively, that is: 
 ( ) ( )1,2,1 lnln ++= tjtjtj ccU β , (1) 
where 10 << β  represents the degree of individual (im)patience to consume over the lifecycle. 
L. Fanti, L. Gori 
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    Individuals at t  can either be employed ( ej = ) or unemployed ( uj = ). If employed, they earn a 
unitary minimum wage, tmw , , fixed by law as a constant mark up 1>µ  over the prevailing 
competitive wage, tcw , , see, e.g., Irmen and Wigger (2006), that is: 
 tctm ww ,, : µ= . (2.1) 
If unemployed, they receive an unemployment benefit tb  defined as a fraction of the competitive 
wage,4 that is: 
 tct wb ,: γ= , (2.2) 
where 10 << γ  is the replacement rate. We assume that unemployment benefits at t  are financed 
with ad valorem taxes ( 0>tτ ) levied on both young-aged and old-aged consumptions of all people. 
    Therefore, the budget constraint when young reads as 
 ( ) tjtjttj xsc =++τ1,1 , (3.1) 
where tjs  is the saving rate of agent j  and { }ttmtj bwx ,,=  is an income-when-young variable equal 
to: (i) the minimum wage if the individual is employed; (ii) the unemployment benefit if she is 
unemployed.5 
    The budget constraint of an old born at t  is 
 ( ) ( ) tjtttj src 111,2 11 +++ +=+τ , (3.2) 
where 1+tr  is the interest rate from t  to 1+t . 
                                               
4
 Note that the results of the present paper would have been qualitatively the same if unemployment benefits were 
proportional to the actual minimum wage, rather than the competitive wage. We thank an anonymous referee for 
suggesting to clarify this point. 
5
 By passing we note that the right-hand side of Eq. (3.1), can alternatively be expressed as ( ) ttm bdwd −+ 1, , where 
d  is a variable that takes value 1 if the individual is employed and 0  is she is unemployed (see Corneo and 
Marquardt, 2000). 
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    Employed and unemployed individuals choose how much to save out of their disposable income 
to maximise the lifetime utility function Eq. (1) subject to Eqs. (3). The first order conditions for an 
interior solution therefore are the following: 
 ( )
1
1
,1
1,2
1
11
+
+
+
+
+
+=
t
t
t
t
j
t
j
r
c
c
τ
τβ . (4) 
Combining Eq. (4) with Eqs. (3), when the individual j  is alternatively employed or unemployed, 
gives young-aged consumption, old-aged consumption and saving of both the employed and 
unemployed of generation t , which are respectively given by: 
 ( )( )t
t
j
t
j x
c
τβ ++= 11,1 , (5.1) 
 
( )
( )( )1
1
1,2
11
1
+
+
+
++
+
=
t
t
j
t
t
j xr
c
τβ
β
, (5.2) 
 β
β
+
=
1
t
j
t
j x
s . (5.3) 
    Defining tL  as the number of employed people at t , aggregate saving in the economy ( tt NsS = ) 
is defined as the sum of savings of both employed and unemployed, that is ( ) tuttett sLNsLNs −+= , 
that can alternatively be written as 
 ( ) tuttett susus +−= 1 , (6.1) 
where ( ) NLNu tt /: −=  is the aggregate unemployment rate at t .6 Therefore, combination of Eqs. 
(5.3) and (6.1) yields aggregate savings as: 
 
( )[ ]ttttmt ubuws +−+= 11 ,β
β
. (6.2) 
    Using the same line of reasoning, summing up young-aged and old-aged consumptions of both 
the employed and unemployed from Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) gives 
                                               
6
 Eq. (6.1) reveals that separating with employed and unemployed people is the same as assuming a representative 
individual that can be employed for the fraction tu−1  of time and unemployed for the remaining fraction tu . 
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 ( )( ) ( )[ ]ttttmtt ubuwc +−++= 111
1
,,1 τβ , (7.1) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttmttt ubuwrc +−+++= +++ 1111 ,111,2 τβ
β
. (7.2) 
 
2.2. Firms 
 
As in Romer (1986), Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Irmen and Wigger (2002), we assume the 
technology of production faced by each firm Ii ,,1=  as: 
 
( ) ααααα −−− == 1
,,
11
,,,, titittitititi LKkBLAKY , (8) 
where tiY , , tiK ,  and tiL ,  are the output produced, and capital and labour hired by firm i , N
K
aA tti =:,  
is an index of labour productivity of each single firm, which is assumed to depend on the average 
per capita stock of capital in the economy, NKk tt /= , and it is taken as given by firm i , 
0: 1 >= −αaB  is a scale parameter and 10 << α . Since all firms are identical, setting tti LL =, , 
tti KK =,  and tti YY =, , then aggregate production at t  is the following 
ααα −−
=
11
tttt LKkBY , where 
( )NuL tt −= 1  is the total labour force employed. Therefore, per capita output is ( ) α−−= 11 ttt ukBy , 
where NYy tt /= , and profit maximisation implies7 
 ( ) 11 1 −−= −αα tt uBr , (9.1) 
 
( ) ( ) αα −−−= tttm uBkw 11, . (9.2) 
    Combining Eqs. (2.1) and (9.2), and knowing that ( ) ttc kBw α−= 1,  is the equilibrium 
competitive wage, the (constant) unemployment rate in this simple economy with homogeneous 
labour is 
                                               
7
 It is assumed that capital totally depreciates at the end of each period and output is sold at unit price. 
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 ( ) αµµ
1
1
−
−== uut . (10.1) 
From Eq. (10) it is easy to verify that a rise in µ  (γ ) monotonically increases (does not affect) 
unemployment. Moreover, the interest rate is lower than under laissez-faire, that is: 
 ( ) ( )11
1
rBr <−=
−
α
α
µαµ .8 (10.2) 
 
2.3. Government 
 
The unemployment benefit expenditure at t  ( tt ub ) is financed with (time-adjusted)9 ad valorem 
taxes levied on the first and second period consumptions of all individuals. Therefore, at time t  the 
per capita government budget reads as: 
 ( )ttttt ccub ,2,1 += τ . (11) 
    Exploiting Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (7.1), the one-period backward (7.2),10 (9.1) and (10.1), the budget-
balancing tax rate is constant and given by: 
 ( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) 






−−−+








−+−
==
111
111
1
1
α
α
µβαγαβµ
µβαγ
µττ t , (12) 
                                               
8
 Note that ( ) 0>µr  for any ( ) Ω− =< µαµ αα :1B , which is assumed to be always satisfied in the analytical results of 
the present paper. Moreover, in the numerical examples presented in Sections 3–5 the interest rate associated with 
different values of the wage mark up used in the simulations is of course always positive. 
9
 In Section 5.1 we study the opposite case of endogenous replacement rate and fixed consumption tax rate. 
10
 Since both the minimum wage and unemployment benefit are introduced at the beginning of time t , the consumption 
of the old-aged born at 1−t  is 
( )
( )( )t
tct
t
wr
c
τβ
β
++
+
=
−
11
1 1,
,2 , where 
c
tc
tc g
w
w
+
=
− 1
,
1,  and ( ) 111 −−+= Bgc αβ
β
 is the 
growth rate of per capita income under laissez-faire. 
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where ( ) 01 =τ  and ( ) 0>′ µτ . Now, in order to make the unemployment benefit policy feasible, we 
need to ensure 0>τ  for any couple ( )γµ, , i.e. denominator of Eq. (12) must be positive. Therefore, 
for any 10 << γ , the benefit expenditure is viable if and only if the government does not fix the 
minimum wage at too high a level, that is Μ<< µµ1 , where Μµ  (that cannot be solved in closed 
form, however) represents the threshold value of the wage mark up below which 0>τ  is fulfilled. 
 
3. Balanced growth 
 
Given the government budget Eq. (11), market-clearing in goods and capital markets is expressed as 
 tt sk =+1 , (13) 
which is combined with Eq. (6.2) to get: 
 
( )[ ]ttttmt ubuwk +−+=+ 11 ,1 β
β
. (14) 
    Since in this paper we are mainly interested in studying the effects of minimum wages on 
economic growth, below we analyse how legislated wage minima affect the evolution of capital 
across periods and, hence, the growth rate of the economy. To this purpose, let us first rewrite Eq. 
(14) as a generic function of the wage mark up as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]µµ uwsk tmt ,,1 =+ . (15) 
    The total derivative of Eq. (15) with respect to µ  gives: 
 ( )
 
( )
  
	
  
	
		
−
+
+−
+
+
++
+
−⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
+−⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
= ttm
tm
tm
t bwu
u
s
u
w
w
s
d
kd
,
,
,
1 1
µµµ
, (16) 
    Eq. (16) reveals that the final effect of a rise in the minimum wage (i.e., a rise in the wage mark 
up) is ambiguous on growth as it increases both wage income and unemployment. The economic 
intuition is simple. Since in an OLG context economic growth is driven by savings, it will be crucial 
how the minimum wage affects the saving rate. On the one hand, a rise in the minimum wage 
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causes a positive effect on savings because the income of the employed is now larger. On the other 
hand, the unemployment rate raises. The rise in unemployment affects aggregate savings through 
two channels of opposite sign: first, the amount of resources saved by the employed is now lower 
because the employment rate is reduced, so that the saving rate shrinks through this channel; 
second, the amount of resources saved by the unemployed is now larger, and this, in turn, positively 
affects savings. However, since the minimum wage is larger than the unemployment benefit, the 
rise in unemployment always tends to reduce aggregate savings, as can easily be ascertained from 
the second addendum of the right-hand side of Eq. (16). 
    In sum, there exists both a positive wage effect and negative unemployment effect on growth 
when µ  raises, and this makes clear the reason why the final effect of a rise in the minimum wage 
on capital accumulation is potentially uncertain in an OLG model.11 
    We now exploit Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (10.1) and (14) to determine how capital evolves across periods, 
that is: 
 ( ) ( ) tct kgk µΗ+=+ 11 , (17) 
where ( )



	














−+=Η
−
1:
11
αα µγµµµ , ( ) 11 =Η  and cg  is the growth rate under laissez-faire (see 
Footnote 7). 
                                               
11
 Notice that in a Ramsey-type infinite horizon growth model, where economic growth is driven by the interest rate 
rather than the saving rate, minimum wages (even if used together with unemployment benefit policies) reduce the 
growth rate of consumption when the technological externality is defined in per capita terms, because the interest rate is 
below the laissez-faire level due to the unemployment occurrence, as Eq. (10.2) reveals (see, e.g., Hellwig and Irmen, 
2001). However, if we alternatively assume, in line with Corneo and Marquardt (2000), that the production externality 
is defined in terms of capital per employed worker (see Ono, 2007 for a discussion about the differences in assuming 
that labour efficiency depends on either capital per capita or capital per worker), then the introduction of minimum 
wages is growth-neutral in a growth model à la Ramsey because the interest rate does not depend on the unemployment 
rate in that case. 
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    From Eq. (17), therefore, the growth rate of capital in the regulated-wage economy with 
unemployment (which is the same as the growth rate of per capita output as the unemployment rate 
is constant) is:12 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 −Η+= µµ cgg . (18) 
Now, let 
 αγ −= 1: , (19) 
be a threshold value of the replacement rate. Then, analysis of Eq. (18) gives the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Let Μ<< µµ1  hold to guarantee feasibility of the unemployment benefit policy. (1) 
If γγ ≤ , then ( ) cgg <µ . (2) If γγ > , then ( ) cgg >µ  for any °<< µµ1 , ( )µg  is maximised at 
µµ ˆ=  and ( ) cgg <µ  if °> µµ , where 
 
1:ˆ >=
γ
γµ , (20) 
and µµ ˆ>°  is the value of the wage mark up such that ( ) cgg =°µ . 
 
Proof. Differentiating Eq. (18) with respect to µ  gives ( ) ( ) ( )µµ Η′+=′ cgg 1 , where 
( )
( )
( )γµγµαµ α
α
−=Η′
+−
−
1
1
 and thus ( ){ } ( ){ }µµ Η′=′ sgnsgn g . Then ( ) 0
<
>Η′ µ  if µµ ˆ
>
<
. Therefore 
Proposition 1 follows, since (1) if γγ ≤ , ( ) 0<Η′ µ  for any Μ<< µµ1 , and (2) if γγ > , the fact 
that ( ) 0=Η′ µ  only at µµ ˆ=  and ( ) 0=Η ′′ µ  only at ( ) µαµµ ˆ1ˆ >+=  complete the proof because 
( ) 1=Η µ  twice at 1=µ  and °= µµ . Q.E.D. 
 
                                               
12
 Since ( )µg  is independent of time the model does not show transitional dynamics, and thus a change in µ  
automatically results in an instantaneous adjustment to a new balanced growth path. 
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Corollary 1. Let 1=µ  hold. If γγ <  ( γγ > ) then the introduction of minimum wages reduces 
(promotes) economic growth. 
 
Proof. The proof is straightforward since ( ) ( )001 ><′g  for any γγ <<0  ( 1<< γγ ). Q.E.D. 
 
    Proposition 1 shows that the growth rate in a regulated-wage economy with unemployment may 
be larger than under laissez-faire. This is due to a combination of minimum wages and 
unemployment benefits. In fact, although the minimum wage causes unemployment, if the 
replacement rate is larger than the weight of the labour input in production (i.e., α−1 ), the positive 
growth effect due to the increased workers’ income dominates the negative unemployment effect, 
and this eventually spurs economic growth beyond the laissez-faire level. Moreover, it is important 
to note that (i) a large enough replacement rate always exists to guarantee beneficial effects of 
minimum wages on growth, (ii) the higher the output elasticity of capital, the lower the size of the 
replacement rate needed for introducing a growth-promoting minimum wage policy, and (iii) a 
growth-maximising minimum wage can exist. Moreover, since both the growth rate and 
unemployment rate increase along with the wage mark up, at least for any µµ ˆ1 << , then a positive 
link between unemployment and growth indirectly exists in such a case. Therefore, in a broad sense, 
our paper may be view as belonging to the literature linking positively economic growth and 
unemployment (see the discussion in Section 1), but using however simple ingredients within an 
intuitive context such as the two-period overlapping generations growth model rather than adopting 
questionable hypotheses within more complicated settings. 
    Of course the way of financing the benefit expenditure is crucial for the results. In fact, with 
consumption taxes, the provision of unemployment benefits is not completely retrieved by the 
amount of resources needed to finance it (as, instead, would be the case with either wage income 
taxes or lump-sum taxes on the young, which would imply both a tax withdrawal and 
unemployment subsidy of the same size, thus leaving the aggregate income of the young 
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unaffected), so that the unemployed will actually receive a grant – and the employed are burdened 
by taxation – in such a way that aggregate consumption, saving and growth are effectively 
supported despite the rise in unemployment. 
    We now illustrate Proposition 1 taking the following configuration of technological parameters: 
45.0=α ,13 which generates 55.0=γ , and 20=B . Then we choose a replacement rate higher than 
the threshold γ , that is 7.0=γ  (in line with the unemployment benefit legislation in several 
European countries). Therefore, the growth-maximising wage mark up is 272.1ˆ =µ  and 
778.1=°µ . As regards preferences, we consider that every period consists of 30 years and assume 
3.0=β  so that the discount factor is 0.96 per annum (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002, p. 50).14 
With this parameter values we obtain ( ) 627.1ˆ =µg , corresponding to which the unemployment rate 
is ( ) 414.0ˆ =µu  and the budget-balancing consumption tax rate is ( ) 26.0ˆ =µτ , while the growth 
rate under laissez-faire is 538.1=cg . Moreover, a whole range of values of the wage mark up, i.e. 
778.11 << µ , can be used by the government to promote growth. In this example, the 
unemployment rate that corresponds to the growth-maximising minimum wage (which is 27.2 per 
cent higher than the competitive wage) is extremely high (41.4 per cent), and the range of minimum 
wages for which an economy grows at a rate higher than the laissez-faire may even reach up the 
77.8 over the market wage. In this stylised economy, however, labour is homogeneous (rather than 
heterogeneous) and the minimum wage is set as a mark up over the market wage (rather than 
computed as a fraction of average earnings, as in several real economies). Therefore, in order to 
evaluate our results for drawing policy conclusions, it may be relevant to introduce labour 
heterogeneity (e.g., skilled and unskilled labour) and then computing the minimum wage as a 
                                               
13
 This value may be considered as an average between the values of the output elasticity of capital in developed and 
developing countries, which, according to, e.g., Kraay and Raddatz (2007), are 33.0=α  and 5.0=α , respectively. 
14
 Note that with this parameter set we obtain a large enough value of the wage mark below which feasibility of the 
unemployment benefit policy is guaranteed, that is 568.6=Μµ . 
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percentage of the average wage. This exercise will be presented in Section 5.2 after showing that 
considering skilled (high-paid) and unskilled (low-paid) labour does not alter the main conclusions 
of Proposition 1 as regards the effects on growth of introducing the minimum wage in the market 
for raw labour. 
    While we have shown that economic growth can actually be fostered by minimum wages, 
another crucial aspect regards their welfare effects. The next section therefore deals with this 
argument and contrasts welfare levels in both the regulated-wage economy with unemployment and 
competitive-wage economy with full employment. 
 
4. Welfare 
 
This section looks at the evolution of individual welfare over time in both the regulated-wage and 
competitive-wage economies along the balanced growth path (BGP henceforth). 
    Although the introduction of wage minima cannot represent a Pareto improvement, because the 
old-aged living at the moment of the reform would not opt for it since (i) the interest rate shrinks 
due to the unemployment occurrence (see, Eq. 10.2), and (ii) the existence of consumption taxes to 
finance unemployment benefits tends to deteriorate their consumption level,15 it could be instructive 
studying whether the minimum wage can make individuals better off along the BGP. Below we 
show that when ( ) cgg >µ  (i.e., Point (2) of Proposition 1 holds), then, asymptotically, the 
minimum wage is always welfare-improving. 
                                               
15
 Let the minimum wage be introduced at t . Then, comparison of the consumption of the old-aged born at 1−t  in 
both the regulated-wage and competitive-wage economies implies ( ) ( )1
,2,2 tt cc <µ , where 
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    Let us begin the welfare analysis by noting that applying a positive monotonic transformation, 
the individual lifetime utility function Eq. (1) can also be expressed as ( ) ( ) βββ +++= 11,21 1,1 ttt ccV , where 
β+
=
1:
tU
t eV . Since both young-aged and old-aged consumption grow without transition at the constant 
rate ( )µg ,16 the time evolution of individual welfare in an economy with legislated wage minima is 
expressed by the indirect utility function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tt gWW µµµ += 10 , (21) 
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( )µµ Π= 100 WW , (22) 
is the welfare level at the time of the introduction of the minimum wage law, i.e. 0=t , 
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which crucially depends on the level of the existing minimum wage, and 
 
( ) ( )β
α
+
−
=
1
11 00,1
Bk
c , (24.1) 
 
( ) ( )β
αβα
+
−
=
1
11 0
2
1,2
kB
c , (24.2) 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] βββ ++= 11,21 10,10 111 ccW , (22’) 
are the initial consumption and welfare levels under laissez-faire, with 00 >k  given. 
    The time evolution of individual welfare in an economy with full employment therefore can be 
conveyed by: 
 ( ) ( )( )tct gWW += 111 0 . (21’) 
                                               
16
 This follows because the unemployment rate, the interest rate and the budget-balancing consumption tax rate are 
constant. 
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    From Eqs. (21) and (21’) it is clear that BGP welfare generically depends on (i) the growth rate 
of per capita income, and (ii) the initial welfare level (i.e. initial consumption). As regards the 
former, to the extent that a rise in the wage mark up is beneficial to economic growth, i.e. Point (2) 
of Proposition 1 is fulfilled, the effects of minimum wages on welfare are positive through this 
channel. As regards the latter, comparison of Eqs. (22) and (22’) makes clear that individual welfare 
at the time of the introduction of the minimum wage law, 0=t , can be higher or lower than under 
laissez-faire depending on whether ( )µΠ  is higher or lower than unity. A rise in the wage mark up 
increases the income of the young, and this tends to raise initial consumption. However, a higher 
minimum wage also implies a higher tax rate to finance an increasing amount of unemployment 
benefits, and the higher the minimum wage, the higher the consumption tax rate. This, in turn, tends 
to deteriorate initial consumption. 
    Therefore, if ( ) 1<Π µ  (that is, consumption at 0=t  in the regulated-wage economy is lower 
than under laissez-faire, because the weight of consumption taxation is relatively high), then the 
final effect of a rise in the wage mark up µ  on welfare is a priori uncertain because of the existence 
of two opposite forces at work: (i) the positive growth effect, and (ii) the negative effect due to the 
deteriorated consumption at 0=t . In this case, therefore, the minimum wage causes welfare losses 
for the current old-aged, for the generation born at time 0=t  and for some generations 0>> Tt . 
However, we will show below that beyond the threshold generation T  the minimum wage implies 
welfare gains because the positive growth effects always dominates in the long run, i.e. when Point 
(2) of Proposition 1 holds consumption grows at a rate higher than under laissez-faire and, thus, 
there certainly exists a threshold generation beyond which welfare becomes larger despite the rise in 
unemployment. 
    In contrast, if ( ) 1>Π µ  (that is, consumption at 0=t  in the regulated-wage economy is larger 
than under laissez-faire because the weight of consumption taxation is relatively low), then we 
obtain the important result that the generation born at 0=t  as well as all the (infinite) subsequent 
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generations will be better off in that case. The minimum wage policy, however, cannot be Pareto 
optimal because the current old-aged are worsened. 
    We now proceed to show the results discussed above. First, using Eq. (23) we identify the 
parametric conditions for which ( ) ( )11 <>Π µ . Second, since the analytical treatment of Eq. (21) is 
cumbersome, we resort to numerical simulations to show that in the long run: (i) the minimum wage 
can effectively produce welfare gains either for all generations 0≥t  or for all generations t  born 
beyond the threshold 0>T , and (ii) in the long run the highest possible welfare level is achieved 
when economic growth is maximised. 
    We now identify the conditions for which the introduction of the minimum wage evaluated at the 
margin ( 1=µ ) may or may not be welfare-improving for all generations 0≥t  but the current old-
aged, i.e. the ones born at 1−=t . 
    Define ( ) ( ) 1: −Π= µµF , 
3
1
21
: <
+
= β
β
αW  and 
( )( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]ββαβ
βαβαγ
−++
++−
=
211
2111
:W , with 10 << Wγ  if 
and only if 1,Wαα <  or 2,Wαα > , where 
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1597221
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++++−+−
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βββββ
αW ,  
 
( )
( ) 12/1,21
1597221
: 2,
234
2, <<+
++++++−
= WW αββ
βββββ
α .  
Since 01, <Wα  it can be ruled out. Then we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. (1) Let Wαα <<0  hold. Then, the introduction of minimum wages (evaluated at 
1=µ ) is welfare-worsening at 0=t . (2.1) Let 2,WW ααα <<  hold. Then 1>Wγ  and for any 
10 << γ  the introduction of minimum wages (evaluated at 1=µ ) is welfare-worsening at 0=t . 
(2.2) Let 12, << ααW  hold. Then for any Wγγ <<0  [ 1<< γγW ] the introduction of minimum 
wages (evaluated at 1=µ ) is welfare-worsening [welfare-improving] at 0=t . 
On economic growth and minimum wages 
 21 
 
Proof. Differentiating ( )µF  with respect to µ  and evaluating it at 1=µ  gives 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )( )( )211
21112111
αββα
βαβαγββαβ
µ
++
++−−−++
=′F .  
Therefore, if Wαα <<0 , then ( ) 01 <′µF . In contrast, if 2,WW ααα << , then since 1>Wγ , 
( ) 01 <′µF ; if 12, << ααW , then for any Wγγ <<0  [ 1<< γγW ], ( ) 01 <′µF  [ ( ) 01 >′µF ]. Q.E.D. 
 
    Proposition 2 reveals that the lower is the weight of employed labour in production, and the 
higher is the replacement rate, the more likely the introduction of the minimum wage increases 
consumption at 0=t . In this case, in fact, the weight of the increased budget-balancing tax rate on 
consumption is relatively low with respect to the increased income when young, and thus welfare 
raises even at 0=t . 
    We now consider how a rise in the minimum wage above the existing level ( 1>µ ) affects the 
function Eq. (23) in the case ( ) 1>Π µ . Although the analysis of Eq. (23) is cumbersome, it can be 
shown that, in general, ( )µΠ  is an inverted U-shaped function of the wage mark up µ . The 
economic reason is that there exists an interval included between the competitive wage (i.e. 1=µ ) 
and a threshold value of the minimum wage (i.e. Π= µµ , where Πµ  cannot be solved in closed 
form) such that all generations 0≥t  can experience welfare gains (of course if Point (2.2) of 
Proposition 2 holds). This also means that if the wage mark up is fixed beyond the threshold Πµ , 
some initial generations Tt <≤0  are harmed. An illustration of this finding is provided in Table 4. 
    We now assume that the conditions of Point (2) of Proposition 1 hold and proceed with some 
numerical exercises to analyse the welfare effects of µ  over time. First, we concentrate on the case 
( ) 1<Π µ . Then we study the case ( ) 1>Π µ . This because the want to stress that there exist cases 
with respect to which the minimum wage can be welfare improving for either all the generations 
0≥t  but the current old-aged or for all the generations t  born beyond a threshold generation 0>T , 
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and then to precisely identify such a threshold generation in the case some initial generations are 
harmed by the minimum wage policy. 
    Using the same parameter set as in Section 3,17 Table 2 summarises the time evolution of the 
individual welfare for the values of the wage mark up reported in Table 1 (Column 1), which also 
shows the corresponding values of the unemployment rate, the budget-balancing consumption tax 
rate and the growth rate (Columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively). 
 
Table 1. The wage mark up and other macroeconomic and policy variables. 
µ  ( )µu  ( )µτ  ( )µg  
1 0 0 1.538 
1.1 0.19 0.096 1.598 
1.272 0.414 0.26 1.627 
1.4 0.526 0.381 1.618 
 
Table 2. The time evolution of individual welfare in both the regulated-wage and competitive-wage 
economies when µ  varies ( 10 =k , 10000/tW ). 
 0=t  1=t  3=t  5=t  7=t  9=t  
( )1tW  0.001 0.0027 0.017 0.112 0.722 4.657 
( )1.1tW  0.0009 0.0025 0.016 0.114 0.773 5.222 
( )272.1tW  0.0008 0.0021 0.0148 0.102 0.706 4.875 
( )4.1tW  0.0007 0.0018 0.0129 0.088 0.609 4.178 
                                               
17
 Note that with this configuration of parameters we get 572.02, =Wα  and, hence, the condition 1>Wγ  is satisfied 
(see Point (2.1) of Proposition 2). Since 572.045.0 <=α , then the minimum wage is welfare-worsening at 0=t  
(see Table 2, Column 1). 
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 11=t  13=t  15=t  18=t  30=t  50=t  
( )1tW  30.01 193.38 1246.10 20382.87 91045.1 ⋅  171080.1 ⋅  
( )1.1tW  35.26 238.11 1607.78 28209.37 91067.2 ⋅  171026.5 ⋅  
( )272.1tW  33.65 232.40 1604.57 29110.33 91015.3 ⋅  171076.7 ⋅  
( )4.1tW  28.64 196.34 1345.94 24156.56 91050.2 ⋅  171074.5 ⋅  
 
    Since the budget-balancing tax rate is higher the larger is the wage mark up (see Table 1), the 
negative welfare effect due to the reduction in initial consumption is stronger the more µ  is 
increased. Thus, Table 2 shows that the generations born at 0=t  as well as in the subsequent 
periods Tt <<0  are made worse off, i.e. the minimum wage policy cannot represent a Pareto 
improvement. However, in the long run welfare gains are obtained irrespective of the size of the 
minimum wage, that is a threshold generation 0>T  exists beyond which all the future generations 
Tt >  are made better off because the positive growth effect asymptotically dominates. In fact, from 
Table 2 we see that when 1.1=µ  (1.272) [1.4] individuals of the fifth (ninth) [thirteenth] 
generation, as well as those born in all future periods, are better off in the regulated-wage economy 
with unemployment than under laissez-faire. Moreover, and most important, Table 2 also shows 
that the highest possible long-run welfare levels are achieved at the growth-maximising wage mark 
up.18 
    We now take a value of the output elasticity of capital higher than the threshold 572.02, =Wα , 
that is 7.0=α ,19 to show that the minimum wage can actually be welfare-improving for all the 
                                               
18
 This has been ascertained through extensive numerical simulations for 50>t  not reported in Table 2 for economy of 
space. Moreover, it can be shown (numerically) that the growth-maximising wage mark up coincides with the welfare-
maximising one when t  becomes large enough. 
19
 The other parameter values are the same as before. 
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generations 0≥t . In this case, therefore, we get 3.0=γ , 544.0=Wγ , 333.2ˆ =µ  (the growth-
maximising wage mark up), 82.14=°µ  and 988=Μµ . Moreover, a whole range of values of the 
wage mark up, i.e. 341.11 << µ , exists such that ( ) 1>Π µ , and then ( ) ( )100 WW >µ  in such a case. 
    In Table 4 we summarise the time evolution of individual welfare for the values of the wage 
mark up reported in Table 3 (Column 1). 
 
Table 3. The wage mark up and other macroeconomic and policy variables. 
µ  ( )µu  ( )µτ  ( )µg  
1 0 0 0.384 
1.1 0.127 0.03 0.452 
2.333 0.701 0.24 0.643 
3 0.791 0.306 0.632 
 
Table 4. The time evolution of individual welfare in both the regulated-wage and competitive-wage 
economies when µ  varies ( 10 =k , 100/tW ). 
 0=t  1=t  3=t  5=t  7=t  9=t  
( )1tW  0.0642 0.0889 0.17 0.327 0.627 1.202 
( )1.1tW  0.0648 0.0941 0.198 0.419 0.884 1.866 
( )333.2tW  0.0565 0.0929 0.25 0.677 1.83 4.943 
( )3tW  0.052 0.0849 0.226 0.602 1.605 4.276 
 
 11=t  13=t  15=t  18=t  30=t  50=t  
( )1tW  2.304 4.418 8.471 22.48 1116 51049.7 ⋅  
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( )1.1tW  3.938 8.311 17.53 53.74 4742 61029.8 ⋅  
( )333.2tW  13.34 36.05 97.35 432 51067.1 ⋅  91045.3 ⋅  
( )3tW  11.39 30.34 80.83 351.4 51025.1 ⋅  91026.2 ⋅  
 
    Table 4 shows that when the output elasticity of capital is high enough, i.e. 12, << ααW , and the 
wage mark up is not fixed at too high a level, i.e. Π<< µµ1 , where 341.1=Πµ , the minimum 
wage is welfare-improving for all generations 0≥t . In this case, in fact, the weight of the increased 
income when young more than counterbalances the negative effect on consumption due to the 
increase in the budget-balancing tax rate so that welfare raises. Of course, when the wage mark up 
increases further on, the weight of the higher tax rate becomes larger and, hence, for any Π> µµ  
there exists some generations Tt <≤0  that incur in welfare losses because consumption shrinks. 
To this purpose, Table 4 shows that when 333.2=µ  (3) the positive growth effect dominates at 
1=t  (3) and welfare gains can then effectively be obtained. Moreover, in the long run the highest 
possible welfare level is still achieved when the government maximises growth. 
    To sum up, the following result holds as regards the welfare effects of the minimum wage: 
 
Result 1. Rewrite Eq. (21) as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
c
tt g
gWW 

	




+
+Π=
1
11 µµµ . We know from Proposition 1 that if 
γγ > , then ( ) cgg >µ  for any °<< µµ1 . Then, for any °<< µµ1 , ( ) ( )1limlim tttt WW +∞→+∞→ =µ . 
In this case, therefore, there certainly exists a threshold generation 0>T  such that ( ) ( )1tt WW >µ  
for any Tt > . Moreover, if Point (2) of Proposition 1 holds, 12, << ααW  and 1<< γγW , then for 
any Π<< µµ1  we get ( ) ( )1tt WW >µ  for any 0≥t . 
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    In the numerical example presented in Tables 1–4 we studied the cases of a once-and-for-all 
minimum wage policy, i.e. we assumed that at time 0=t  a binding minimum wage is introduced, 
for instance at the growth-maximising value, and then kept unchanged in all future periods. The 
latter policy, of course, tends to drastically reduce consumption (and welfare) of the first T  
generations due to the financing of the unemployment benefit with proportional consumption taxes, 
as the unemployment rate associated with the growth-maximising wage mark up is relatively high. 
Nevertheless, another important issue is whether welfare losses can actually be smoothed across the 
first T  generations with a gradual or progressive increase in the minimum wage from period to 
period up to the growth-maximising level.20 Does a gradual introduction in the minimum wage 
really tend to smooth its impact across generations? In order to answer this question in Table 5 we 
summarise – using the same parameter set as in Tables 1–2 – the welfare effects of two different 
minimum wage policies: (i) the once-and-for-all growth-maximising policy (Table 5.A), and (ii) a 
progressive increase in the wage mark up to the growth-maximising level (Table 5.B). 
 
Table 5.A. The time evolution of individual welfare in both the regulated-wage and competitive-
wage economies: the case of the once-and-for-all minimum wage policy ( 10 =k , 10000/tW ). 
 0=t  1=t  3=t  5=t  7=t  9=t  
( )1tW  0.001 0.0027 0.017 0.112 0.722 4.657 
( )272.1tW  0.0008 0.0021 0.0148 0.102 0.706 4.875 
 
                                               
20
 This argument is relevant especially because the introduction of the minimum wage in several European countries 
followed such design, even when the process was rapid as recently in the U.K. or Ireland (see, e.g., Dolado et al, 1996 
for evidence of the impact of different minimum wage policies in Europe). We thank an anonymous referee for 
suggesting to clarify this point. 
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Table 5.B. The time evolution of individual welfare in both the regulated-wage and competitive-
wage economies: the case of a progressive increase in the minimum wage ( 10 =k , 10000/tW ). 
 0=t  
05.1=µ  
1=t  
1.1=µ  
3=t  
15.1=µ  
5=t  
2.1=µ  
7=t  
25.1=µ  
9=t  
272.1=µ  
( )1tW  0.00106 0.0027 0.017 0.112 0.722 4.657 
( )µtW  0.00101 0.0025 0.016 0.108 0.721 4.875 
 
Comparison of Tables 5.A and 5.B, therefore, makes clear that it is better to gradually introduce the 
minimum wage rather than fixing it at the growth-maximising value directly at the time of the 
introduction of the reform, i.e. 0=t , as the welfare losses of the first seven generations are smaller 
than in the case of the once-and-for-all growth-maximising policy. Moreover, and most important, 
welfare gains are obtained starting from the ninth generation in both cases. The economic reason 
why welfare losses are smoothed across generations is that a with progressive increase in the wage 
mark up, the rise in unemployment is gradual and then lower from period to period. Hence, the need 
of raising consumption taxes to finance the benefit system as well as the negative impact of the 
minimum wage on consumption of the initial generations 0>T , can actually be smaller in such a 
case. 
 
5. Extensions 
 
We now present some modifications and extensions of the baseline model. In particular, in Section 
5.1 we assume the replacement rate, rather than consumption tax rate, as the endogenous variable 
that balances the government budget. In Section 5.2 we relax the hypothesis of homogeneous 
workers and assume the existence of skilled and unskilled labour and then introduce the minimum 
L. Fanti, L. Gori 
 28 
wage for the unskilled (low-paid) jobs. Finally, in Section 5.3 a capital income tax is used to finance 
the unemployment benefit system.21 
 
5.1. Endogenous replacement rate 
 
In this section we assume the replacement rate tγ , rather than the consumption tax rate τ , is 
endogenous and adjusted from period to period to balance out the unemployment benefit budget Eq. 
(11). 
    Exploiting Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (7.1), the one-period backward (7.2), (9.1), (10.1) and (11), the 
(constant) budget-balancing replacement rate is obtained as 
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. (26) 
Exploiting Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (10.1), (14) and using (25) to eliminate the replacement rate, the growth 
rate in the regulated-wage economy is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,1, −Ρ+= τµτµ cgg , (27) 
where ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]τβα
ταβµ
τµ
α
α
++−
+−+
=Ρ
−
111
11
:,
1
, ( ) 0, <′ τµµg  and ( ) 0, >′ τµτg , that is the rate of economic 
growth is a monotonic decreasing (increasing) function of the wage mark up (consumption tax). 
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 This extensions follow the suggestions of three anonymous referees. 
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    Now, define 
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as the threshold value of the consumption tax such that ( ) 1, =Ρ τµ , where ττ ~>
 , and 
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as the threshold value of the wage mark up below which 0~ >τ . 
    Although a rise in µ  is now always growth-reducing, the following proposition shows that 
minimum wages used in conjunction with unemployment benefits can stimulate growth. 
 
Proposition 3. Let µµ ~1 <<  and τττ 
<<~  hold. Then ( ) cgg >τµ,  and the unemployment benefit 
policy is feasible. 
 
Proof. From Eq. (27) it is easy to verify that ( ) cgg =τµ,  if and only if ( ) 1, =Ρ τµ . Since 
( ) 1, >Ρ τµ  for any ττ ~> , 0~ >τ  for any µµ ~1 << , and the unemployment benefit policy is feasible 
if and only if ττ 
< , then Proposition 2 follows. Q.E.D. 
 
5.2. Skilled and unskilled labour 
 
In this section we assume that two types of labour do exist: skilled ( S ) and unskilled (U ). The 
market for skilled labour is competitive and the market for unskilled labour is regulated by law. We 
take the division of labour exogenously and assume that each young is endowed with θ  units of 
unskilled time and θ−1  units of skilled time (inelastically supplied on the markets for unskilled and 
skilled labour, respectively), where 10 << θ  (see, e.g., Martínez and Iza, 2004). Therefore, 
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SU NNN += , where NNU θ=  and ( )NN S θ−= 1 . For the skilled time individuals earn a unitary 
competitive wage Stw . For the unskilled one they earn instead a minimum wage 
U
tc
U
tm ww ,, : µ=  
fixed by law if employed, where Utcw ,  is the competitive wage of the unskilled, while receiving a 
benefit Utct wb ,: γ=  if unemployed. Of course, UtmSt ww ,> . Preferences over young-aged and old-
aged consumptions are still determined by Eq. (1). Therefore, aggregate savings are now given by: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }tttUtmStt ubuwws +−+−+= 111 ,θθββ , (30) 
where ( ) NLNu Utt θθ /−=  is the unemployment rate in an economy with heterogeneous labour and 
U
tL  is the demand for raw labour. 
    There are three factors of production: physical capital ( K ), skilled ( SL ) and unskilled ( UL ) 
labour. The production function of the single firm i  at time t  now is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 321132321
,,,
1
,,,,,
ααααααααα U
ti
S
tititti
U
ti
S
tititi LLKkBALLKY
−+
== , where 1321 =++ ααα , 32 αα >  
and the labour productivity index tiA ,  is defined as in Section 2.2, with 0: 11 >= −αaB . Aggregate 
production at t  therefore takes place according to ( ) ( ) 32111 αααα UtStttt LLKkBY −= , where 
( )NNL SSt θ−== 1  and ( ) ( ) NuNuL tUtUt θ−=−= 11 .22 The intensive form production function is 
( ) ( ) 21221 11 11 ααααα θθ −−−− −−= ttt ukBy . Profit maximisation implies: 
 ( ) ( ) 111 21221 111 −−−= −−−− ααααα θθα tt uBr , (31) 
                                               
22
 This production function implies limited substitutability between all production factors (see, e.g., Lindh and 
Malmberg, 1999; Fanti and Manfredi, 2005). The question of the degree of substitutability between production inputs is 
still controversial in literature. Although recent contributions provided evidence in favour of capital-skill 
complementarities (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993; Duffy et al., 2004), in this context such an assumption would lead to a lack 
of mathematical tractability. The important investigation of considering capital and skilled labour to be more 
complement then capital and unskilled labour in an economy with minimum wages is left for future research. 
On economic growth and minimum wages 
 31 
 ( ) ( ) 21221 1112 11 ααααα θθα −−−−− −−= ttSt ukBw , (32) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )21221 111 21, ααααα θθαα +−+− −−−−= ttUtm ukBw . (33) 
Since ( ) ( ) ( )21211 21, ααα θθαα +−−−−= tUtc kBw , then from Eq. (33) the unemployment rate is 
 ( ) 21
1
1 ααµµ +
−
−== uut . (34) 
Therefore, a rise in µ  increases unemployment and reduces both the interest rate and skilled wage, 
and thus it also decreases the ratio of the skilled wage to the unskilled one.23 Moreover, since a rise 
in γ  does not affect unemployment it leaves the ratio UtmSt ww ,/  unaltered. Therefore, the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled wage is greater when skilled labour is relatively scarcer (see, e.g., Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti, 2001), i.e. when θ  is relatively high. 
    The government budget is ( )ttttt ccub ,2,1 += τθ  and thus the budget-balancing consumption tax 
rate now becomes: 
 
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )








−−−−+








−+−−
==
+
+
111
111
21
21
1
211
1
21
αα
αα
µβααγβαµ
µβααγ
µττ t . (35) 
which is similar to Eq. (12) and where ( ) 01 =τ , ( ) 0>′ µτ  and 0>τ  for any ΜΜ<< µµ1  (with 
ΜΜµ  being the new threshold value of the wage mark up below which the unemployment benefit 
policy is feasible in the case of skilled and unskilled labour). 
    Since equilibrium in goods and capital markets is still determined by Eq. (13), the growth rate of 
the economy can now be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 −Η+= µµ cgg , (36) 
                                               
23
 Notice that this result is similar to that obtained by Sener (2006, Proposition 1, p. 785), which, in an open economy 
model à la Ramsey, focuses on the effects of minimum wages on (i) unemployment, (ii) the relative wage skilled-
unskilled, and (iii) the R&D intensity, but neglecting however both growth and welfare issues. 
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where ( )( ) 111
1
212 1
1 −−−+
=
−− ααα θθαβ
β Bgc  is the growth rate under laissez-faire in an economy 
with labour heterogeneity, ( )








−
−
−−
+=Η +
−
+
−+
2121
21 1
21
1
1
11
1
: αααα
αα
µ
α
ααγµµ  and ( ) cgg =1 . 
   Let 
 11: αγ −= , (37) 
be a threshold value of the replacement rate. Then we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. Let ΜΜ<< µµ1  hold to guarantee feasibility of the unemployment benefit policy. 
(1) If γγ ≤ , then ( ) cgg <µ . (2) If γγ > , then ( ) cgg >µ  for any °°<< µµ1 , ( )µg  is maximised 
at µµ ˆˆ=  and ( ) cgg <µ  if °°> µµ , where 
 
1:ˆˆ >=
γ
γµ , (38) 
and µµ ˆˆ>°°  is the value of the wage mark up such that ( ) cgg =°°µ . 
 
Proof. Differentiating Eq. (36) with respect to µ  gives ( ) ( ) ( )µµ Η′+=′ cgg 1 , where 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )γµγµ
ααα
ααµ αα
αα
−
+−
−−
=Η′ +
++−
21
211
211
21
1
1
 and thus ( ){ } ( ){ }µµ Η′=′ sgnsgn g . Then ( ) 0
<
>Η′ µ  if 
µµ ˆˆ
>
<
. Therefore, Proposition 3 follows, since (1) if γγ ≤ , ( ) 0<Η′ µ  for any ΜΜ<< µµ1 , and (2) 
if γγ > , the fact that ( ) 0=Η′ µ  only at µµ ˆˆ=  and ( ) 0=Η ′′ µ  only at ( ) µααµµ ˆˆ1ˆˆ 21 >++=  
complete the proof because ( ) 1=Η µ  twice at 1=µ  and °°= µµ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4 shows that in an economy with heterogeneous labour the same parametric conditions 
of an economy with homogeneous labour are involved in determining whether a minimum wage 
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can foster growth. In fact, comparison of Eqs. (19) and (37) reveals that the replacement rate 
beyond which the minimum wage is beneficial to growth still depends on the size of the output 
elasticity of capital. Moreover, Eq. (38) shows that the growth-maximising wage mark-up is now 
determined as the ratio between the replacement rate and the sum of the weight of skilled and 
unskilled labour in production, rather than the weight of (homogeneous) labour. This means that 
labour heterogeneity does not alter any of the conclusions of the baseline model. 
    The model built on in Section 2 as well as that of Section 5.2 represent of course a theoretical 
abstraction on the role of an important labour market institution such as the legally set minimum 
wage in affecting growth and welfare in a stylised economy, as wage minima have been assumed to 
be determined as a mark up upon (i) the prevailing equilibrium competitive wage, in the case of 
homogeneous labour (Section 2), and (ii) the prevailing equilibrium competitive wage in the market 
for raw labour, in the case of labour heterogeneity (Section 5.2). In real economies, however, the 
minimum wage is computed as a fraction of average earnings, and beneficiaries are essentially the 
poorest among low-paid workers. One of the most widely accepted measure of the impact of wage 
floor is the weighted Kaitz index. On the basis of such an index, minimum wages in Europe are 
found to be higher than in the U.S. (see Dolado et al., 1996, Table 1, p. 322–323), ranging between 
one third and one half24 (see also OECD, 2008 and ETUI Policy Brief, 2009 for more recent 
evidence). 
    At the moment of writing the present paper, there exists a wide consensus at the European level 
to raise as well as to make the minimum wage uniform for citizens of several European Union 
countries in a measure even higher than the 50 per cent of average earnings (see, e.g., Schulten and 
                                               
24
 The Kaitz index for Italy is even much higher. However, a national legislated (minimum) wage floor in this country 
does not exist, while being determined as a bargaining between unions and employers in sectoral collective agreements, 
and then it may greatly differ from sector to sector because of the existence of differentiated minimum wage rates. 
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Watt, 2007).25 The question of whether introducing a coordinated European minimum wage policy 
is debated essentially to reinforce labour market institutions and protect workers against the severe 
recession recently experienced. Moreover, even in some States of the U.S. the minimum wage has 
been recently set at a level higher than the federal one as a measure to combat recession. Therefore, 
the question now is the following: would the positive effects of minimum wages on growth be 
confirmed in a simple overlapping generations endogenous growth model à la Romer with 
heterogeneous labour, in the case wage minima were realistically computed as a fraction of average 
wages? 
    For a simple quantitative illustration of the theoretical predictions of the model we now refer to 
an example of a European country where opponents and proponents of the existing minimum wage 
indexation mechanisms battled in the recent years, i.e. the case of France.26 In order to answer the 
question above through a calibrated numerical exercise we assume first the (minimum) wage floor 
for low-paid workers to be computed as a percentage of the weighted average wage between skilled 
and unskilled labour when 0=u , that is ( )[ ]UtcStcUtm wwzw ,,, 1: θθ +−⋅= , where 10 << z . 
Therefore, the wage gap in an economy with full employment is 
θ
θ
αα
α
−−−
=
11 21
2
,
,
U
tc
S
tc
w
w
. Second, 
from EUROSTAT (2005) Data (e.g., Table A.2, Hipolito, 2008), we take the 90-10, 50-10 and 90-
50 differentials (i.e., the ratios of the 10th, 50th and the 90th deciles) of the wage distribution are 3.36, 
1.64 and 2.00, respectively.27 Third, by assuming for simplicity a uniform distribution within the 
                                               
25
 In particular, “… the core proposal [of a European-wide minimum wage floor should involve] … an undertaking by 
all countries to raise, within a given time scale, their minimum wage to initially 50% and subsequently 60% of the 
average wage.” (ETUI Policy Brief, 2009, p. 5). 
26
 See Cahuc et al. (2008) and Askenazy (2008) for debates about the policy effects of the minimum wage amongst 
French economists. 
27
 Note that important papers dealing with wage inequality for United States and other developed countries are Blau and 
Kahn (1996), Goldin and Katz (2007), Autor et al. (2008). 
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50-10 and 90-50 deciles, we obtain an approximated value of the ratio between the lowest wage 
(i.e., the wage of the 10 per cent of the low-paid) and average wage around 2.00. Since France has a 
current statutory minimum wage of about the 45-50 per cent of the average wage (see OECD, 2008; 
ETUI Policy Brief, 2009),28 then this would approximately correspond to a wage floor covering the 
10 per cent of the low-paid. 
    Therefore, taking seriously into account recent proposals to attempt to raise the minimum wage 
in several European countries up to 60 per cent of the average wage (see Footnote 25), we easily see 
that this would push the wage floor29 up of about the 20 per cent, so that the preceding measure of 
wage inequality 50-10 and 90-10 deciles are in the short run compressed from 1.64 to 1.36 and from 
3.36 to 2.8, respectively. What the consequences in terms of growth of raising the statutory 
minimum wage from 45-50 to 60 per cent would be in our context? 
    Our exercise is the following. Since the minimum wage covers the 10 per cent of workers among 
the low-paid we assume 1.0=θ . Then we take the output elasticity of capital for France from 
Rodríguez and Ortega (2006, Table A.1), so that 5.01 =α , and calibrate 473.02 =α  such that the 
wage gap (i.e., the ratio between the average and lowest wages) is 2
,
,
=U
tc
S
tc
w
w
. It is therefore 
implicitly assumed that the current wage of the unskilled is the competitive one, that is the existing 
(minimum) wage floor (equal to the 50 per cent of the average wage) is not binding. The production 
                                               
28
 More precisely, ETUI Policy Brief (2009, Table 1) reports the 51.4 per cent from OECD data and the 48.3 per cent 
from ILO data for the year 2007. 
29
 Note that it is assumed – for illustrative purposes – that the wage floor only regards the first deciles of the whole 
population. Therefore in our model with only two categories, the share of unskilled (earning the lowest wage) is 0.1, 
while the remaining 0.9 is assumed to be skilled (thus earning the average wage above calculated, which is 
approximately double the amount of the wage earned by the lowest 10 per cent of the low-paid). Note that current 
statutory minimum wages in Europe only cover a very low share of workers, ranging between 1 and 5 per cent in 
several countries, so that the conjecture that a rise in the statutory value up to 60 per cent of the average wage to cover 
the 10 per cent of workers seems to be rather realistic. 
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scale parameter ( 60=B ) is fixed to get a reasonable growth rate around 1.7 per cent per annum in 
the case of full employment. The subjective discount ( 11.0=β ), instead, is calibrated to obtain a 
propensity to save around the 10 per cent (see, e.g., Jappelli and Padula, 2007, Table 1 for the case 
of France). The replacement rate γ  is assumed to be 0.6.30 
    A simple calculation therefore shows that if the statutory minimum wage were raised as proposed 
from 50 to 60 per cent of the average wage, the (minimum) wage of the unskilled will raise from 
13.14
,
=
U
tcw  to 2.16, =
U
tmw  (i.e. almost the 20 per cent above the wage of the unskilled in the 
competitive-wage economy; this corresponds to 14.1=µ  in our context) and the per annum growth 
rate (assuming each generation consists of 30 years) will increase from 1.705 per cent in the 
competitive wage economy to 1.712 per cent in the regulated-wage economy. The unemployment 
rate is reasonably at the 12.5 per cent and the consumption tax rate to finance the unemployment 
benefits is negligible at the 0.24 per cent. Moreover, the rise in the growth rate also raises the 
skilled wage because of the higher capital accumulation; as a consequence, and thus not only the 
current unskilled but also all the future skilled will beneficiate of the higher minimum wage. 
    The numerical examples above, therefore, revealed that the minimum wage, even when 
realistically computed as a fraction of average earnings, and used together with a system of 
unemployment benefits, should be used as an instrument to promote growth and welfare. Of course, 
since our model economy is highly stylised, policy conclusions that can be derived should be 
carefully evaluated. However, since an indirect positive relationship between unemployment and 
growth certainly exists from a theoretical viewpoint, our results shed light on the beneficial effects 
the minimum wage can play in a simple and intuitive framework such as the one-sector Cobb-
Douglas endogenous growth model à la Romer. 
                                               
30
 The amount of the ARE (return to work credit) in France varies according to the wage received by the jobseeker 
during the reference period. The gross amount of the unemployment benefit is equal to the highest of the following two 
sums: 57.4 per cent of the SJR (reference daily salary) or 40.4 per cent of the SJR plus 11.04 euro per day. Then, in our 
context a replacement rate around 55-60 per cent can be realistic. 
On economic growth and minimum wages 
 37 
 
5.3. Capital income tax 
 
As is known, in an OLG context taxing capital income may stimulate growth because it causes a 
positive inter-generational transfer effect towards the young savers (see Bertola, 1996; Uhlig and 
Yanagawa, 1996). In this section we briefly show that financing unemployment benefits with 
capital income taxes, rather than consumption taxes, produces beneficial effects on growth even if 
the range of values of wage mark up such that the regulated-wage economy grows faster than the 
competitive-wage economy is reduced with respect to the baseline model analysed in the previous 
sections. 
    Since the propensity to save in independent of the interest rate with Cobb-Douglas preferences 
(see Eq. 6.2), the growth rate of the economy is still given by Eq. (18). The government budget, 
instead, becomes: 
 tttktt krub ,τ= , (39) 
where 10
,
<< tkτ  is the capital income tax rate. Using Eqs. (2.2), (9.1), (10.1) and the one-period 
backward Eq. (13), the (constant) budget-balancing capital income tax rate is: 
 
( )
( )
1
11
1
,
−
−







−
== µα
αµγ
µττ
α
B
B
ktk . (40) 
From Eq. (40), the unemployment benefit policy is feasible if and only if for any 10 << γ , 
Rµµ <<1  holds, where Rµ  (that cannot be solved in closed form) is the wage mark up such that 
( ) 1<µτ k . Therefore, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. Let Rµµ <<1  hold to guarantee feasibility of the unemployment benefit policy. 
Then, conclusions of Proposition 1 still remain valid. 
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Proof. Since Eq. (18) holds and Rµµ <<1  guarantees ( ) 1<µτ k  then Proposition 5 follows. Q.E.D. 
 
To illustrate Proposition 5 we take the same parameter values as in Section 3. The growth-
maximising wage mark up, therefore, still remains 272.1ˆ =µ , so that ( ) 627.1ˆ =µg  and 
( ) 414.0ˆ =µu . The budget-balancing capital income tax is ( ) 522.0ˆ =µτ k , which is higher than in the 
case of consumption taxes ( ( ) 26.0ˆ =µτ ). Moreover, the range of wage up for which the 
unemployment benefit policy is feasible shrinks from 568.61 =<< Μµµ  in the case of 
consumption taxation to 562.11 =<< Rµµ  in the case of capital income taxation. The beneficial 
effects on growth of using the minimum wage combined with unemployment benefits financed with 
capital income taxes rather than consumption taxes are therefore reduced. 
    The analyses presented in this section, therefore, revealed that the beneficial effects of the 
minimum wage on growth (with tax-financed unemployment benefits) are a robust feature of OLG 
economies with both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper takes a dynamic view on labour market rigidities. Analysis of labour market 
imperfections and the effects of unemployment in aggregate macroeconomic models have been 
widely studied in the economic literature. As regards how legislated wage minima affect economic 
growth, conclusions are essentially negative unless when the minimum wage causes positive 
external effects (for instance, on the accumulation of human capital, the R&D sector and so on) or 
when capital and labour are relatively complement in production, i.e. the elasticity of substitution 
between factor inputs is relatively low. 
    In contrast to the previous theoretical literature, in this paper we introduce minimum wage and 
unemployment benefit policies in a simple double Cobb-Douglas overlapping generations growth 
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model à la Romer (1986). It is shown that a regulated-wage economy with unemployment may 
grow more rapidly than the laissez-faire, and a growth-maximising minimum wage exists in the 
case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour. We have also shown that the growth-
promoting effect of the minimum wage is robust to different unemployment benefit policies (such 
as financing the benefit system either with consumption taxes or capital income taxes as well as by 
assuming the replacement rate or the tax rate as an endogenous variable to balance out the 
government budget). Moreover, since the minimum wage in real economies, especially in Europe, 
is computed as fraction of average earnings, in the model with heterogeneous labour we presented a 
calibrated numerical example for the case of France, where the debate between economists and 
politicians about both the macroeconomic effects and indexation mechanisms of wage floor were 
heated recently, to show the beneficial effects on growth of raising the minimum wage up to the 
sixty per cent of the average wage. 
    Moreover, we found that minimum wages can be welfare-improving and the highest possible 
long-run welfare level is achieved when balanced growth is maximised. In particular, we identified 
the conditions under which the minimum wage can make the current as well as all the future 
(infinite) generations better off.31 
    The essential message of the present paper, therefore, is that minimum wage policies can be used 
not only for equity reasons but also to promote economic growth and welfare even in the absence of 
positive external effects the minimum wage may create. 
    Our findings contribute to the economic literature framed in the basic one-sector endogenous 
growth model and have straightforward policy implications. In particular, the present paper may 
                                               
31
 Interestingly, we have also analysed how a progressive rise in the minimum wage (see the cases of Ireland and U.K.) 
affect growth and welfare in contrast to the once-and-for-all policy. With a gradual rise in the wage floor we found that 
it is more likely that the generations from the current one onwards are better off (although the minimum wage it cannot 
be Pareto optimal because the current old-aged suffer due to the unemployment occurrence and the corresponding 
reduction of the rate of interest). 
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complement the paper by Irmen and Wigger (2002), where, in an overlapping generations context 
similar than ours, but considering a right-to-manage union that fixes wages, rather than a legislated 
minimum wage, and without assuming unemployment benefit policies, a positive relationship 
between unionised wages, unemployment and economic growth is established. Their result, 
however, holds only when capital and labour are enough complement in production, and thus it is 
prevented in the of case Cobb-Douglas technology, while our findings are confirmed (a fortiori) in 
the case of complementarity between production factors. 
    The present paper can be extended in several directions. For instance, utility and production 
functions can be generalised and an open economy framework used to assess the role the minimum 
wage can play on economic growth and welfare in such a case. Moreover, fertility can be 
endogenised with individuals being free to choose both the quality and quantity of children and then 
accumulate human capital through education. Finally, deficit and debt policies32 could be 
incorporated to enrich the model and test for robustness of the minimum wage policy in a dynamic 
context. 
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